We apply model based verification to cyber range event environment configurations, allowing for the early detection of errors in event environment configurations, and a reduction in the time and resources used during deployment. We categorize misconfiguration errors detected using the Common Cyber Environment Representation (CCER) ontology. We also provide an overview of a methodology to specify verification rules and the corresponding error messages. These rules have successfully detected errors in the designs of several cyber range event environments, thereby reducing cost and time to deployment.
INTRODUCTION
Cyber ranges provide the infrastructure needed to conduct testing, training, and exercise events over operationally relevant and representative environments. Conducting large cyber range events requires considerable effort and time. A cyber range event has four distinct phases: planning and design, deployment, execution, and post-execution [1] . One way to reduce the time taken to conduct an event is to reduce the time spent in the deployment phase. Improving procedures in the deployment phase also reduces the total amount of resources used, because some of the cyber range's most expensive resources are used during the deployment and execution phases. Any errors detected during deployment will require debugging and, therefore, add to the time and range resources used for deployment. This problem is not unique to cyber ranges. Configuration errors have been found to be one of the dominant causes of system failures [2] . It has been estimated that configuration errors account for 50% to 80% of the downtime and vulnerabilities in cyber infrastructure [3] . Therefore, finding and eliminating errors in the environment configuration prior to deployment can help diminish the time and resources consumed detecting, debugging, and fixing these errors during the event's deployment phase.
One effective way to reduce these errors is to verify and validate the environment configuration even before the environment is fully deployed. We explore the use of a model based approach for detection of configuration errors in the planning and design phase. The verification and validation of network configurations has been studied extensively [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . However, previous work either does not provide a methodology for identifying and specifying rules, or describe how the corresponding rule violation error messages are generated to help environment designers. Both of these are important when verifying an event configuration that may include users, applications, operating systems, servers, hosts, routers, switches, control planes, and instrumentation planes, many of which lack models for their configuration.
Our main contributions in this paper are the following. First, we have developed a configuration ontology called Common Cyber Environment Representation (CCER). Second, we present a classification scheme for misconfiguration errors based on an analysis of the more than 125 rules currently implemented using CCER. Third, we establish the importance of visual elements in a diagram in generating error messages corresponding to these rules when the environments are described in diagrams. Finally, we describe a methodology for identifying and specifying verification rules and error messages for cyber range event environments. In the past two years, these rules have been used to flag configuration errors in environment designs for several cyber range events.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the CCER ontology, and its current component ontologies. Section 3 describes the connections between diagrams, verification rules, and error messages, with examples from CCER. Section 4 provides a classification of misconfiguration errors detected using CCER. Section 5 provides an overview of a methodology for developing the verification rules, and for specifying corresponding rule violation error messages. Section 6 provides a case study motivating our claims about time savings in deployed ranges, Section 7 reviews related work, and Section 8 concludes this paper.
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CCER
CCER is an ontology used for specifying operationally relevant and representative cyber range event environment configurations. Ontologies have been used previously to specify cyber event assets, for example by Nodine et al. [10] . The CCER ontology is specified in the Web Ontology Language, OWL [11] . The CCER ontology contains representative and constructive models [1] of configuration of entities in the event environment.
The CCER ontology contains multiple topics. Each topic is a largely self-contained configuration ontology unto itself. The current topics include the following:
• User: organizations, teams, and behaviors of users.
• In the next section, we provide an overview of our system for creating diagrams, applying rules, and generating errors.
DIAGRAMS, RULES, AND ERRORS
Designers describe event environments using a diagram. When developing verification rules, it is important to meaningfully report errors in the diagram to the designers, especially if they are unfamiliar with the rules. Therefore, error or warning statements must be specified within the context of how an environment is represented (in this case, as a diagram). In this section, we provide an overview of our system to design an event environment and generate rule violation error messages. An ontology instance contains information corresponding to a specific entity in the event environment. For example, in the IP Device topic, the Computer Ontology instance will specify the configuration of a specific Computer. This instance is specified as a NamedIndividual [11] , Ent-NSClient1_CCERID_44_1, belonging to the Computer OWL Class (Fig. 2) . The shape instances in a diagram are translated into CCER ontology instances containing many NamedIndividuals of OWL classes for further processing.
Processing an Event Environment Description
The NamedIndividuals also specify one or more data and object properties. An object property specifies a reference to another NamedIndividual, whereas a data property specifies any value other than such a reference. In RDF, property statements are referred to as triples with the structure <Subject, Property, Object>. In Fig. 2 , the NamedIndividual corresponding to the Computer OWL Class is the Subject, and object properties specify the NamedIndividual that is the Object. For example, hasUser is an object property with the value Person_CCERID_1_17 that is a NamedIndividual of a User OWL Class. There are multiple hasUser object properties with different such NamedIndividuals as Objects.
Furthermore, the data property hasInstalledApplication specifies the application's CPE string. Note that there are multiple such properties with different CPE strings for this Computer instance.
Figure 2: Example Computer Ontology Instance
To summarize, the CCER ontology defines the OWL Classes and any data and object properties, while the ontology instance defines the NamedIndividuals that are members of OWL Classes and the values for the data and object properties of NamedIndividuals. Explaining all of the properties for the Computer instance in Fig. 2 is outside the scope of this paper.
The verification engine processes the ontology instance by applying the verification rules. The verification engine attempts to find all errors, instead of finding the first error and stopping. The rules should be processed over the ontology instances corresponding to both error-free and erroneous diagrams. This requirement imposes much harder requirements in processing diagrams. To prevent verification engine from crashing while processing such diagrams, we do several preprocessing steps. For example, to be able to report Uniqueness Violation error (explained in Section 4), irrespective of whether the values specified in a shape instance are unique or not, unique NamedIndividuals are automatically created for every shape instance in a diagram because RDF ignores duplicate NamedIndividuals [11] .
Visual Schema
Visual schemas describe objects in terms of the physical properties and spatial-arrangements of their components [13] . CCER visual schema defines the shapes in diagrams, their fields, the spatial-arrangements and implied semantic relationships among the shapes. We consider a visual schema as static if the shapes, fields, default values of the fields, or relationships among the shapes do not change during the creation of a diagram, and as dynamic if they do change.
In CCER, the current visual schema is specified using a Visio Stencil [14] . The CCER Visio Stencil is a static visual schema. A Visio Stencil (.vss file) is a collection of shapes associated with a particular Microsoft Office Visio template (.vst file). A CCER Visio Stencil will hold shapes that contain shapes with fields created by the CCER team.
The CCER visual schema specifies the shapes and their fields, and includes the following relationships. Fig. 3 , the Subnet shape is a Container shape, and its "west.org" instance contains other shape instances such as a Computer, Server, and DNS Service. In this case, the value of a field in west.org may be inherited by these shape instances. Note that a shape can be both a Container and a Containee. For example, the Subnet shape itself may be a Containee shape with respect to another shape, Cyber Range. Interface connector shape instance has a field with a Default Gateway value, and is connected to a Subnet shape instance, the Subnet shape instance inherits this value, and the Computer shapes within the Subnet shape instance in turn will also inherit this value.
Diagrams and Error Statements
Error messages, including warning messages, are generated when a verification rule violation is detected. The errors need to be described in terms of the shape instances and fields to make sense to the diagram designer, even though the rule that flags this error is processed over the ontology instance that may have different names and relationships. Errors may be shown visually on a diagram by annotating a shape instance, or through textual error statements that refer to shape instances and the values in their fields. However there are challenges in creating such error messages. We describe some of these challenges below.
Complex Relationships
When the ontology instance and shape instance have a oneto-one correspondence between the shape fields and OWL Class properties, it is easy to specify the error messages in terms of the shape instances, even though the rule is implemented over the ontology instance. However, sometimes fields in a shape instance may not map to a single ontology instance. This is usually the case when some of the relationships described in the previous section are involved. Below are a couple of examples that illustrate this situation.
Container Relationship Example:
In this case, errors in an ontology instance may be caused by the absence or presence of values inherited by a shape instance from a Container type shape instance. Consider a Subnet shape that is a Container shape (see Fig. 3 ). The Host and Server shape instances within a Subnet shape instance inherit the value of the Default Gateway field from the Subnet shape instance. Therefore, an error in the Default Gateway value discovered on a Host shape instance is really caused by the Default Gateway value in the Subnet shape instance, and should be reported as such. In some situations, the shapes that are within a Container shape are allowed to override the inherited value, and in such situations, the inherited value and the provided value need to be compared prior to generating the error message.
Aggregation Relationship Example:
Since an aggregator shape instance (see Fig. 5 ) describes multiple ontology instance elements and properties using a single shape instance, when an error is detected in one generated ontology instance, then all such generated instances will have the same error. To prevent a deluge of the same error for all such instances, the error messages should be limited to just one.
TYPES OF VERIFICATION ERRORS
CCER's rules were developed organically over two years, motivated by the needs of actual cyber range events. We have analyzed the verification rules in terms of the types of errors they describe. The following may serve as a checklist for deriving rules.
Invalid Format:
The value entered in a visual field does not match the value's required format. 2. Unspecified Value: A required value is not specified in a field of the shape. 3. Inconsistent Value: A specified value is not consistent with another value elsewhere in the diagram. 4. Out-of-range Value: The specified value is out of the contiguous range or the set of allowed values for the value. The range can be directly or indirectly specified. An indirect specification occurs when the range for a field value is implied due to the value of a field attribute elsewhere in the model. 5. Uniqueness Violation: When the same shape instances or corresponding ontology elements require uniqueness in one or more field values within a specified scope, and this uniqueness is violated, this error occurs. In our experience, the most common cause of this error is "copy-andpasting" shape instances in a diagram. 6. Non-existent Reference (Direct): A reference specified in a field does not exist in the diagram. 7. Non-existent Reference (Indirect): A value specified for a field does not match a related field in any other shape instance. 8. Unspecified Reference: A required reference is not specified in a field of a shape. 9. Inconsistent Reference: A specified reference is not consistent with another specified reference elsewhere in the model. In the next section, we discuss both the methodology of verification rule development and corresponding error statement specification using CCER with examples.
METHODOLOGY FOR RULE DEVELOPMENT
While developing verification rules for elements within the various ontology topics, over time, we observed that we were repeatedly following the same steps. Developing the verification rules requires a precise model of the configuration of the components or concepts, a specification of the OWL Classes, and relevant object and data properties. We describe these steps below, and also illustrate with an example based on a DHCP service.
Step 1: Develop a written description of the configuration of the entities in sufficient detail. Note that there may be many entities that interact in a model description, and some of the existing entities may need changes due to interactions with the new configurations.
Example: The DHCP Service will need an IPAddress Range specification that will be allocated to Hosts, and IPAddress Exceptions in the IPAddress Range. The DHCP Service will need to specify the server on which it will run (DHCPServiceName). The IPAddress Range should be identified as public or private. Each entity that can have an IPAddress in the Event Plane must specify whether it is a DHCP Client. Currently, only dynamic DHCP address allocation is permitted. Also, DHCP Service is currently not permitted on a Router.
Step 2: Describe the shapes, their attributes, and constraints such as available choices that are required to generate the corresponding ontology instance.
Example: See Fig. 6 . The ServerName specifies the server on which this DHCP Service will run. The StartingDataIPAddress and the EndingDataIPAddress specify the IPAddress Range for allocation. The IPAddress Exceptions specify the IPAddress exceptions separated by a semicolon. The StartingControlIPAddress and the EndingControlIPAddress specify the range of ControlIPAddresses. The ControlIPAddressExceptions specify the exceptions separated by a semicolon. Finally, the IPAddressSpace allows a drop down list of Private or Public (with Private being the default).
Figure 6: Fields
Step 3: Describe in detail the OWL Classes, data properties, and object properties of the ontology corresponding to the configuration. Also, create a sample ontology instance for the OWL Classes with sample object and data properties. Fig. 7 describes an ontology instance of an OWL Class for the DHCP Service with the associated object and data properties. Note that the OWL Classes corresponding to the "object" of object properties also need to be created if they do not already exist.
Figure 8: IPAddressRange Instance
The instances (NamedIndividuals) of the IPAddressRange OWL Class are used in the dataIPAddressRange and controlIPAddressRange object properties (Fig. 8 ).
Step 4: Define the verification rules and error statements. In this step, the shapes in the fields are evaluated for all of the error categories discussed in Section 4.
Example: The example shown in Fig. 9 shows one of the DHCP Rules and the corresponding error message. In the error message, the phrase "DHCP Service:" refers to the shape concerned, and the phrase starting with "$DHCPService" refers to the corresponding ontology instance. If the ExceptionIPAddresses specified by the users needed to be shown in the error message, those would need to be specified with both the ":" and "$" qualifiers. Fig. 10 shows that the development activity took most of the time, and the requirements analysis required less than half as much time. The requirement analysis activity included discussions on specific missing details, including those that caused verification errors. In this particular case's requirements analysis, an initial sketch of a diagram was drawn prior to working with the CCER tool suite, and a record of the time spent drawing that diagram was not available for inclusion in our statistics. Over 300 errors were reported and corrected in the development phase, but the deployment phase did not get delayed due to misconfiguration of the entities in the diagram. These proportions are consistent with other cases we have worked on.
Our system currently has over 125 verification rules. In many cases, we are able to create error messages that directly refer to the erroneous shape instances in the diagram. Frequent users of the system are able to make sense of even cryptic error messages. We find that both new users and frequent users are occasionally surprised by the errors shown, though for different reasons. New users are surprised because of their unfamiliarity with the errors, and frequent users are surprised because they did not expect to make such simple errors. Most users took less than a day to become comfortable developing new diagrams, understanding the error messages, and correcting errors for commonly used shapes.
RELATED WORK
In previous work applying model based verification and validation for software configuration Cordero et al. [15] built a software development environment that uses to support the development and verification of on-board software for spacecraft. Tanizaki et al. [16] use a SAT solver approach to model and check the consistency of configuration files and discover syntactic and semantic errors. Quinton et al. [17] have established an architecture based on feature models and ontologies to describe and model cloud computing systems, reducing variability when working with multi-cloud configurations.
In the field of firewall configuration and policies, current approaches to model based verification and validation include work by Brucker et al. [18] , who provide a formal model of stateful and stateless firewalls, and a framework that tests actual firewalls using that model. Moussa et al. formalize the process of verifying consistency among a set of firewalls with a global security policy [9] . Adão et al. [19] present a tool for converting abstract firewall models into concrete configurations for the Netfilter networking framework in Linux. Windmüller [7] uses a configuration that combines a model checker, a graphical modeling environment, and external tools to simplify the process of testing and validation of firewall setups for end users. Industry efforts such as Cisco's CLI [20] have focused on specific entities such as Routers. Finally, Anderson et al. [6] report on an online network validation tool for Emulab.
However, the approaches mentioned above do not fully address the needs for configuring a rich set of entities within an event environment. These approaches also are not designed to be sufficiently extensible and flexible to support the addition of new domains, nor do they address the problem of explaining errors in a way that a novice designer can understand.
We hope to evaluate the models developed in such works for future cyber range event environments. For example, cyber ranges often attempt to replicate critical infrastructure networks-such as those belonging to a transportation system, a hospital, or an industrial plant-that have both cyber and physical components. This is in the tradition of Tang et al. [21] , who extended the use of Modelica, a modeling language to describe complex physical systems, into the realm of cyber-physical systems modeling.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a model based verification approach employed in the CCER tool suite for use by cyber range event environment designers. We identified the key role a visual schema plays in generating appropriate error messages when verification rules are violated. We have presented a categorization of configuration errors, and described a methodology for creation of rules and error messages. This methodology is being used to create additional verification rules for new domains. We have successfully used the CCER tool suite to create cyber range environments of varying complexity and scale for several events.
We still have much work to do to improve our systems. One area for improvement is reducing the number of error messages corresponding to the same user mistake. Another area is the evaluation of the impact of a dynamic visual schema on reducing the time involved in detection and fixing errors. Making the error messages more intuitive for designers is another area of future improvement.
We continue to expand our configuration ontologies, write new rules and error messages using the methodology described in this paper. We also plan a performance analysis of the rules verification engine to study how performance is affected by the size of the diagrams.
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